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ing words" inciting violence "on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender," was unconstitutional because it prohibited only particular
fighting words and violated the restriction against content-based discrimination. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at
2200-01 (quotingR.A.
505 U.S. at
(1992». The Mitchell Court distinguished the penalty enhancing statute, which involved constitutionally
unprotected conduct, from the ordinance in R.A. V. because that ordinance explicitly prohibited expression. Id. at 2200-01.
In addition, the Court noted the
societal value and importance of the
penalty-enhancement statute's appli~
cation to discriminatory conduct. Id.
at 2201. The Court determined that
society's need to redress discriminatory crimes justifies the existence of
the penalty-enhancement statute.
Therefore, the Court rejected the con-

v.,
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tention that the statute was founded
merely upon the legislature's disagreement with such discriminatory beliefs. Id.
The Supreme Court concluded by
dismissing Mitchell's contentions that
the penalty-enhancing statute is constitutionally overbroad and has a chilling effect on speech. Id. In so holding, the Court envisioned the stifled
tones of bigoted individuals who anticipate future trials where evidence
of their bigotry is allowed, and found
such a hypothesis not only attenuated,
but too speculative to warrant
Mitchell's contention. Id. The Court
further noted that the First Amendment does not bar the use of speech as
evidence of elements of a crime, and
that Mitchell's contention in this regard had previously been rejected in
Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631
(1947). Id. at 2201-2. Therefore,
evidence of discriminatory conduct is

admissible in establishing the applicability of the penalty-enhancement
statute.
In affirming the legislature's imposition of a stronger incentive for
racially motivated crimes by concluding that a penalty-enhancing statute
does not violate the First Amendment,
the Supreme Court has opened the
window of opportunity for Congress
to take action in addressing racial
unrest and discriminatory problems
throughout the United States. Upholding the constitutionality of a statute which allows increased penalties
for hate motivated crimes not only
provides a framework for the conflicting state decisions on similar statutes, but also takes a bold step in
granting the government the power to
address the discrimination which
plagues our country.

The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently defined how damages
should be calculated for loss ofhousehold services and loss of wages for the
"lost years" when a plaintiff's normal life expectancy has been reduced
as a result of a defendant's negligence. In Monias v. Endal, 330 Md.
274,623 A.2d 656 (1993), the court
expanded a personal injury plaintiff's
recovery by permitting an award for
lost earnings damages for the period
of the "lost years" of the plaintiff's
shortened life expectancy. At the
same time, the court refused to permit
recovery for loss of services to the
plaintiff's children during the same
time period.
Glenna and Andrew Endal filed a
medical malpractice action against
Ms. Endal' s gynecologist, Dr. Michael
Monias, alleging that Dr. Monias was
negligent in failing to diagnose and
treat breast cancer in Ms. Endal. In
August, 1986, Glenna Endal went to
Dr. Monias after discovering a small
lump in her breast. She was assured

that the lump was "fibrocystic breast
disease," and there was "nothing to
worry about." Dr. Monias ordered a
mammogram, but did not order a biopsy. Ms. Endal saw Dr. Monias six
months later as instructed. Again, a
mammogram was ordered, but not a
biopsy.' Approximately eight months
after her second visit, Ms. Endal returned to Dr. Monias, who then referred her to a specialist who performed a biopsy which revealed a
malignant tumor. A lumpectomy revealed that the cancer had metastasized and was in an advanced state.
According to expert medical testimony, if the breast cancer had been
properly diagnosed in August, 1986,
Ms. Endal would have had an 8590% probability of survival and a
normal life expectancy. Because the
cancer had advanced, Ms. Endal had
onlya20%chanceofsurvival beyond
November, 1992.
The case was submitted to the
jury on written issues, and the trial
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judge divided the elements of damages into damages before November,
1992, the statistically probable date
of Ms. Endal's premature death, and
damages after November, 1992, which
were called "post premature death"
danlages. The second category included 1) the loss of income between
Ms. Endal's probable date of death
from cancer to her probable retirement date at age 65, and 2) loss of
services to her three children from
Ms. Endal's probable date of death
until the youngest child reached age
18.

The total jury award for damages
for the period before November, 1992
was $461,682.00. "Post premature
death" damages were awarded in the
amounts of $250,000 for loss of income or earnings, and $200,000 for
loss of household services to the children. In an unreported opinion, the
court of special appeals affirmed the
jury's determination of liability and
affirmed all damage awards except
for the $200,000 "post premature
death" damage award for the loss of
household services to Ms. Endal's
children. Thecourtofappealsgranted
certiorari to review the damage award
for loss of earnings and loss of services.
The court of appeals began its
discussion of the loss of earnings
award by noting that this was a personal injury action as opposed to either a survival or wrongful death action, and that recovery in this action
would preclude a duplicative recovery for the same damages for loss of
support in a wrongful death action.
Manias, 330 Md. at 279-80. The
cou rt specifically rejected Dr. Monias'
contention that future loss of wages is
limited to the plaintiff's actual (shortened) life expectancy rather than the
plaintiff's normal expectancy had the
tort not occurred. ld. at 280. This
issue had been left open in Rhone v.
Fisher, 224 Md. 223, 231-32, 167
A. 2d 773,779 (1961), where the court

stated the rule that "generally a plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages
for the 'lost years' themselves where
the defendant's tort shortened the
plaintiff's life expectancy." ld. at
280-81, 623 A.2d at 659. However,
the plaintiff in Rhone failed to raise
the issue of loss of earnings for the
"lost years."
Stating that "[they would] not
permit the tortfeasor to reduce liability for the victim's loss of earnings by
reducing the victim's life expectancy,"
the court found that Ms. Endal was
entitled to her loss of future earnings
based on the normal life expectancy
had she been properly diagnosed and
treated. ld. at 282, 623 A.2d at 660.
As for the loss-of-services award,
the court of appeals concluded that
the award for the period before Ms.
Endal's probable premature death was
included in either the $200,000
"noneconomic damages" award, or
the $75,000 award for loss of consortium. ld. at 283, 623 A.2d at 660.
The loss-of-services award at issue
was the "post premature death" award
of $200,000 for "loss of household
services to children."
As noted above, the general rule
is that a plaintiff cannot recover damages for the "lost years" of a shortened life expectancy caused by a
defendant's negligence. Rhone v.
Fisher, supra. The Rhone court did,
however, acknowledge two potential
categories ofrecoverable damages relating to a plaintiff's "lost years."
The first category was mental suffering resulting from knowledge of the
shortened life expectancy. The Rhone
court upheld a jury's award that included such damages. Monias, 330
Md. at 283, 623 A.2d at 660. The
second category, approved in the instant case, was "lost earnings during
the lost years." ld. The Monias court
recognized that this case involved a
third category - "loss of services that
the tort victim will not be able to
provide to her family because of her

shortened life expectancy." ld. at
284, 623 A.2d at 660.
The court referred to Ms. Endal's
contention that loss-of-services damages should be treated the same as
loss-of-earnings damages, but noted
that none of the cases cited by Ms.
Endal in support of this contention
addressed the issue of loss-of-services damages as it related to the "lost
years" of a plaintiff's life expectancy.ld. at 284, 623 A.2d at 661.
The court differentiated between
the two, stating that the case for recognizing loss-of-services damages relating to "lost years" is not as compelling as the case for recognizing
loss-of-earnings damages for the same
years. ld. "Loss-of-earnings damages are to compensate a tort victim
for income the victim will not receive
because of the tort. Loss-of-services
damages, on the other hand, are to
compensate a tort victim for services
the victim will not be able to provide
because ofthe tort." ld. (emphasis in
original) Recognizing that while tort
victims may seek damages for loss of
services they would have provided for
themselves, the court pointed out that
the loss-of-services award in the instant case was to compensate Ms.
Endal's family. Holding that family
members should properly seek recovery for loss of services in a wrongful
death action, the court of appeals
found no justification for extending
Rhone to permit a personal injury
plaintiff's family to recover an award
for loss-of-services damages for the
"lost years" of a shortened life expectancy.ld. at285, 623 A.2dat661.
The court also presented, and rejected, two alternative theories for
permitting an award for loss of household services to children. First, recognizing that this type of award is
similar to a claim for "loss ofparental
consortium," the court found that
Maryland law has not recognized such
a claim for children except in the
context of a wrongful death action.

Id. Second, while Maryland has recognized a limited claim for loss of the
economic value of a child's services,
the court declined to recognize a reciprocalloss ofparentai services claim
on behalf of minor children. Id. at
286,623 A.2d at 661-62.
By pennitting a personal injury

plaintiff to recover damages for lost
income, the Court ofAppeals ofMaryland eliminated the general rule that a
plaintiff cannot recover for the "lost
years" of a shortened life expectancy caused by a defendant's negligence. However, by refusing to allow
recovery of damages for the tort

victim's children under a "lost years"
theory, and refusing to recognize alternative theories of recovery, the cou rt
of appeals has made it clear that tort
victims and their families have specific means of seeking recovery that
the judiciary is not willing to expand.
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McCready Memorial Hospital
v. Hauser

CLAIMANT'S ATTEMPT TO
OBTAIN AUTOMATIC EXTENSION FOR FILING EXPERT'S
CERTIFICATE PURSUANT TO
THE MARYLAND HEALTH
CARE MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS STATUTE NOT TRIGGERED BY MERE REQUEST
UNDER § 3-2A-04(b)(J)(ii).

In McCready Memorial Hospital v. Hauser, 624 A.2d 1249 (Md.
1993), the Court of Appeals of Maryland recently held that a claimant
instituting an action under the Maryland Health Care Malpractice Claims
Statute and attempting to obtain an
extension to file the required certificate of qualified expert under Md.
Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-2A04(b)( 1)(ii) must actually file the
expert's certificate within 180 days
from the initial filing of the action.
The court concluded that a 90-day
extension was automatic in a narrow
class of cases, however, merely requesting a § 3-2A-04(b)( I )(ii) extension is not the proper path a claimiant
should take.
On March 14, 1990, five days
before the statute oflimitations was to
run on their claim, John and Maxine
Hauser filed a claim with the Health
Claims Arbitration Office (''HCAO'')
pursuant to the Maryland Health Care
Malpractice Claims Statute, Md. Cts.
& Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 3-2A04(b)(I). The Hausers named the
Edward J. McCready Memorial Hospital and two doctors who had consulted with Mrs. Hauser as defendants. They alleged that the doctors
had negligently diagnosed her condition, allowing a cancerous tumor to
go untreated. McCready Memorial
Hospital was to be held vicariously
liable for the acts of the doctors.
While the Hausers' "claim was
timely filed, [they] failed to file an

expert's certificate with the HCAO
within 90 days as required by § 3-2A04(b)(l)(i) . . . . " Id. at 1251-52.
After the filing period had expired, the
defendants filed motions to dismiss,
asserting that the Hausers had failed
to comply with the filing requirements
of § 3-2A-04(b)( I )(i). Not until July
3, 1990, 21 days after the 90-day
filing period had expired, did the
Hausers respond to the motions to
dismiss. Id. at 1252. An expert's
certificate was not filed; however, the
Hausers requested a 90 day extension
pursuantto §3-2A-04(b)(l)(ii), which
reads:
(ii) In lieu of dismissing the claim,
the panel chainnan shall grant an
extension of no more than 90 days for
filing the certificate required by
this paragraph, if:
1. The limitations period applicable to the claim has expired;and
2. The failure to file the certificate was neither willful nor the
result of gross negligence. ld.
The Hausers contended that they
came under the ambit of § 3-2A04(b)( 1)(ii), asserting that the statute
oflimitations had run and their failure
to file an expert's certificate was neither willful nor the result of gross
negligence. Id.
At a hearing on October 17, 1990,
over 200 days after the Hausers filed
their claims, the HCAO Panel Chair
dismissed the claims for failure to file
an expert's certificate or request an
extension within the initial 90-day

